Abstract
Introduction
Armed conflicts cause major damage and bring with them devastating consequences for a country, including casualties, displacement of populations, and the destruction of public infrastructure. In the long term, it appears to be very difficult to re-establish peace after a period of conflict. A World Bank report (2003) showed that the economic and social costs of wars are high and that they persist for years after the end of the conflict. In recent years, there has developed a substantial literature in which researchers debate the long-term negative consequences of armed conflicts. For instance, Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2004) show that the Allied bombing had a significant but temporary impact on post-war city growth in Germany as a whole, as well as in West Germany separately (although this is not the case for city growth in East Germany). Most studies arrive at similar conclusions. Miguel and Roland (2006) present evidence drawn from the American bombing in Vietnam. They find that war had no lasting impact on poverty rates, consumptions levels, literacy, infrastructure or population density. Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol (2007) In the last decades, almost three-fourths of all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been affected by armed conflicts (Gleditsch et al., 2002) . Situations of conflict are often considered to be one of the most important factors in the deterioration of education. For example, Akresh and de Walque (2008) demonstrate the strong negative impact of Rwanda's genocide on children's schooling, with exposed children completing one-half year less education, resulting in an 18.3% decline in school completion. In the first place, children are often the first victims of wars: Bird (2007) underlines that two million children have died in the past decade as a consequence of armed conflict within the SSA region, and six million more have been injured or permanently disabled. In addition, as O'Malley (2010) points out, education, as one of the more visible institutions in the civil society, is often targeted by the belligerent parties in countries affected by military conflict. In many cases, an attack on the educational system represents an attack on the state. Conversely, certain states or paramilitary organizations may target academics in order to neutralize real or imagined opponents. In some contexts, there is also a phenomenon of youth recruitment into armed militias (child soldiers). The displacements caused by wars also prevent children's enrollment in school. In 2009, 27 million people worldwide were displaced, including 11.6 million people in 21 African countries (IDMC, 2010) . Evidently, such events entail more drastic effects in Africa, as some countries in the region have education participation indicators which are among the lowest in the world. In 2007, in SSA, the Net Enrollment Rate (NER) was approximately 72% (UNESCO, 2010) . Some countries, like Eritrea or Niger, did not even reach the 50% level. On average, the literacy rate in SSA was measured at 60%, but in Chad or Sierra Leone, it did not exceed 40% of the total population. In the same year, 72 million children worldwide were not attending school, of whom 32 million lived in SSA. Since the beginning of the 2000's, and in spite of the fact that African countries have expanded primary enrollments, rapidly developing current trends have illustrated a probable failure to reach Universal Primary Education (UPE) for 2015 (Easterly, 2009) .
Given this context, the objective of this study is to present preliminary results on the effects of war on education in a broad sample of countries in the SSA region. The question is:
to what extent is school enrollment impacted by armed conflicts? We assume that wars have a negative impact on schooling. However, this assumption raises certain issues: do all conflicts, whether civil, interstate or international, have the same effects? Are the consequences uniform whatever the intensity and duration of the conflict? Are both girls and boys affected equally by conflict? By means of a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) database, we attempt to measure the impact of war on a sample of 43 countries in SSA from 1950 to 2010. We gathered information on conflict from the Peace Research Institute (PRIO) and indicators of civil liberties and political rights from the Freedom House. We then combined educational data from the Barro & Lee database and economic data from the Penn World and the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
Data and methodology
Our analysis focuses on Sub-Saharan African countries. The African continent includes a majority of countries which, in respect to current trends concerning the goal of universal education, will not, in all likelihood, achieve the objectives of Education for All (EFA) by 2015 (UNESCO, 2010 . In addition, most of the countries in SSA have been affected by 4 armed conflicts. Thus, 43 Sub-Saharan countries compose our sample of countries (for a list of countries with country codes, see Appendix A).
When studying these countries over time, the main obstacle we face is the lack of data and the reliability of that which is available. In this study, we rely on a number of databases known for their rigor and relevance. We have thus built from several databases a panel Territorial armed conflict between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory;
Interstate armed conflict between two or more states;
Internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from others states;
Internationalized internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from others states on one or both sides.
1 UCDP/PRIO Armed conflict dataset, version 4-2009. Available at http://www.prio.no/ (accessed on 07/12/2010).
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The data also characterize the conflicts in respect to their level of intensity. The viewpoint here is largely dichotomist: at between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year, a conflict is considered as minor. A minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year qualifies the conflict as major.
Over the observed sixty year period, we find that 80% of the countries in our sample were engaged in at least one conflict (Appendix C territories, including all the countries in our sample. The score indicated in the database is the average of the separate scores for civil liberties and political rights. In the Freedom House ranking, countries whose combined average for political rights and civil liberties fell between 1.0 and 3.0 (i.e., 1.0≤avg_pr_cl<3.0) were designated "free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 (i.e., 3.0≤avg_pr_cl<5.5) "partly free"; and between 5.5 and 7.0 (i.e., 5.5≤avg_pr_cl≤7.0) "not free".
The empirical analysis explores the behavior patterns of education variables during periods of armed conflict. Using TSCS data 6 , we test the impact of various economic, social and political variables on education variables. In this context, we preferred a simple method of fixed-effects (FE) regression, one for each SSA country. This provides a first evaluation of the effects of armed conflict by estimation through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The panel literature includes extensive debate about how to model effects, and in particular, whether we should treat them as fixed or random. For TSCS data, fixed effects are a more appropriate choice, whereas random effects are used for panel data (Beck, 2001 ).
The fixed-effect regression can be modeled as follows:
Where Y it is the dependant variable observed for individual i at time t; α i is the unobserved individual effect, β the parameter of interest and µ i,t the error term. 
Results
Adopting this causal framework in the statistical modeling that follows 7 , we selected three educational variables: the rate of children not attending school, the primary school completion rate and the secondary education enrollment rate. As part of our preliminary results, we chose to limit the explanatory variables. In terms of the variables of conflict, preliminary tests revealed that the variable "internal armed conflict" was more significant than the other three variables of conflict (territorial armed conflict, interstate armed conflict and internationalized armed conflict). It therefore seemed interesting to aggregate the latter into a single variable (called "Other conflict" in our models) and compare it to the first variable of conflict (called "Civil conflict" in our models). To appreciate the effect of conflict on education, we also selected the variable "intensity".
In terms of economic variables, we chose the GDP per capita, the investment share of real GDP per capita, the military and education expenditures, both also defined as a share of GDP. In order to take diffusion effects into account, these economic variables were lagged for five years in the models (indicated "L5" below).
As for the approach we selected to treat the data in a panel reference, it seemed meaningful to broadly decompose the variety of sources in search of that which is endogenous. When analyzing primary education completion rate, the average correlation within countries reaches a level of 0.64; on the other hand, correlation within years over the entire period studied reaches a level of 0.06. Respective values for the rate of children not attending school are 0.57 and 0.34 and 0.44 and 0.32 for the rate of secondary enrollment. In this way, spatial dispersions outbalance dispersion due to dynamic effects, particularly in the case of the primary completion rate.
7 For our empirical analysis, we used the software Stata, version 11.0. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
In this model (Table 1) , we find that the variables of conflict have a positive and significant effect on the rate of children not attending school. The assumption that conflicts increase the non enrollment rate is thus verified in the first model, and this impact is similar both for boys and girls. Military expenditures, which generally increase during a conflict, also have a positive and significant effect.
In contrast, the variables "education expenditures" and "investment share" have a negative effect. They thus act to reduce the proportion of children not attending school. The GDP is also significant although its coefficient is low compared to the other two variables.
Finally, the variable "intensity", describing the severity of a conflict, has a negative but not significant effect in terms of usual confidence levels, except for boys. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Based on these results, we can say that if education expenditures had increased by 1% five years ago, the rate of children not attending school would have decreased by 1.7%.
Conversely, if military expenditures had increased by 1%, the rate of children not in school would have increased by 0.8%. The disparity between girls and boys is more significant.
Indeed, the rate of boys not attending school would decreased by 3% and the rate of girls by "only" 0.8%. Thus, spending on education would be first allocated to boys in early grades. In other words, demand of education within families gives advantage for boys. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
In this model (Table 3) , the variables "civil conflict", "other conflicts" and "military expenditures" have a negative effect on the primary school completion rate, as well as for girls than for boys. This trend may justify our assumptions although these variables are not always significant.
On the other hand, other economic variables have a positive and significant effect. We can say that social spending, particularly that targeted to education ("education expenditures"), increases the primary school completion rate, particularly for girls. This is verified by the average marginal effects (as for the first mode, show that this additional expenditure has no significant effect for boys in respect with the data we used. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Turning now to the secondary school enrollment rate (Table 5) , our results are appealing. They confirm previous results. Conflicts and related expenditures (military expenditures) have a negative effect, while social spending has a positive one. In this model, and contrary to our findings concerning primary education (Table 3) , coefficients are significant (except impact of military expenditures change for girls). Conflicts therefore have a very strong impact on secondary enrollment.
The average marginal effects are also interesting, particularly in gender analysis: Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
Here, the difference between girls and boys is more significant. If education expenditures had increased by 1% five years ago, 4.1% more girls could reach completion for secondary against 1.6% for boys.
14 The R-squared (R 2 ) in the models merits commentary. Indeed, its analysis reveals that the explanatory variables account for a large part of the variance in the models. In the analysis of our data by Stata, we had the choice between two main commands: xtreg, fe and areg. We chose the areg procedure. This command includes the robust option for the correction of heteroskedasticity in groups 9 using White's method. In fact, the coefficient estimates and standard errors are the same using the xtreg, fe and areg procedures, but the calculation of the R 2 is different. In the areg procedure, we estimate coefficients for each of our covariates and for each dummy variable in our groups. In the xtreg, fe procedure, the reported R 2 is obtained simply by fitting a mean deviated model where the effects of the groups (all of the dummy variables corresponding to country cases) are assumed to be fixed quantities. All the group effects are simply subtracted out of the model and no attempt is made to quantify their overall effect on the fit of the model. The SSE (sum-of-squares-error) is the same regardless of which approach we take, but the SST (sum-of-squares total) is different. In the xtreg, fixed-effect approach, the R 2 reported is not the R 2 that is calculated from the regression for areg, but the regression for the mean detrended dataset. As such, the SST in the xtreg, fe approach is less than the SST in the areg approach. The difference is real. When adopting the xtreg, fe method, the effects of the groups are fixed and unestimated quantities which are subtracted out of the model before the fit is performed. In the areg approach, the group effects are estimated and affect the total sum of squares of the model under consideration. The examples below illustrate this point: Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
First, the comparison between the two models shows that the coefficients are identical, except for the variable "other conflicts".
Xtreg, fe computes three R-squared values. The "R 2 within" gives the share of intraindividual variability of the dependent variable explained by the explanatory variables. The "R 2 between" considers the contribution of the fixed effects to the model. The "R 2 overall"
reflects the overall quality of the regression.
In the example given above, we can say that variety within the country explains 16% of the variance in the model whereas variety between countries accounts for 35%. Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.
In Table 9 , variety within the country explains 23% ("R 2 within") of the variance in the model whereas variety between the countries accounts for 35% ("R 2 between"). We note a difference in the variables of conflict. Indeed, the coefficients are similar but in model 1, they are not significant.
In both cases, we can conclude that variety is mainly explained by the difference between countries rather than by intra-individual variety.
Finally, we tested the Freedom House's indicators on the educational performances.
Freedom House ranks countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties. Countries are classified according to various indicators which translate the situation in the country, at a particular observation date, for objectives that are derived to a large extent from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Obviously, these objectives are documented by means of factual events such as the transparency of political choice, liberty in the press and so on (reference to latest FH report). Countries are assessed as free, partly free, or not free in terms of political rights and civil liberties in accordance with the value attributed each year to each country for these two indicators. Each indicator is scaled from the value of 1, the best situation, to the value of 7, the worst.
Our present hypothesis is based on the fact that these two indicators may be impacted by the population's participation in education. In fact, we must use extreme caution, as such a hypothesis is largely impossible to test without the expected spurious correlations and structural effects. One fractional issue might be to chart the evolution of both indicators in respect to three main explaining factors: the indicator of school participation, GDP per capita taken as a trend for economic development and the occurrence of a conflict during the 5 year span that preceded the observations.
In this case, we could adopt a panel approach, as the variation of indicators and variables is here largely heterogeneous within countries; we calculate panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates for linear cross-sectional time series models where the parameters are estimated by either OLS or Prais-Winsten regression 10 . When computing the standard errors and the variance-covariance estimates, the procedure used assumes that the disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels.
We did not use fixed effect dummies here, so the variety explained is low. Results concerning primary school achievement are to be rejected due to their lack of confidence. For other variables, the impact of past or present conflict shows a marginal value close to 0.5 for both the political rights and civil liberties scales. Despite its high significance, the marginal impact for the uneducated population at age 15 is low. A simulation of marginal impact, that is to say a decrease from the 20% level to the 10% level in this uneducated population, results in a decline of around 0.25 in both scales of political rights and civil liberties. Impact effects from change in secondary education are higher, as, for example, a move from 20% to 30% means a decline (more liberties) of around 0.30 in both scales of freedom potential. 
Discussion
These preliminary results confirm that armed conflicts have a strong negative impact on education. Indeed, results show that the rate of children not attending school as well as that of secondary school enrollment is very sensitive to conflicts (Tables 1 and 5 ). The model presented in Table 3 shows that the primary completion rate appears to be less affected.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the cases of secondary school and children not in school, when the country's resources are allocated to education, they contribute significantly to improving school enrollments. Military expenditures have the opposite impact since school enrollments decrease under its effect. In a general way, the calculation of the average marginal effects (Tables 2, 4 and 7) demonstrates that the rate of children not attending school could decrease by 1.7%, the primary and secondary completion rates would increase respectively by 4.4% and by 2.6% if an extra 1% only of the GDP were allocated to education expenditures.
The secondary school enrollment rate would increase by 2.2% (Table 6 ). These findings
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indicate that a rise in education investment has two effects: on the one hand, the primary school completion rate increases; on the other hand, further study in secondary school also increases significantly. The discrimination between girls and boys is instructive. Education expenditures benefit first to boys (Tables 1 and 2 ). Certainly by choice inside families, boys are first enrolled in school rather than girls. Then, results show that along school career, these expenditures have more marginal effects on girls. Indeed, if an extra 1% only of the GDP were allocated to education expenditures, the completion rate of girls for primary would increase by 3.9% (Table 4) . On the other hand, in secondary school, the enrollment rate would increase by 2.4% for girls against an increase at level 2.1% for boys (Table 6 ). The completion rate is more significant. Indeed, respectively for girls and boys, this rate could increase by 4.1% against 1.6% (Table 7) . Thus, investment in education provides a better retention of girls in the school system, both in primary education and secondary education.
Certainly, UPE is one of the goals of EFA, but several studies have highlighted the importance of secondary school. In a study of fragile states, Chauvet and Collier (2007) underline that one of the characteristics of these states is the relentless nature of their fragility and the lack of reforms. The introduction of reforms, including in particular a wealthier economy, is considered to be a necessary condition for the advancement of fragile states out of the category. Unfortunately, the econometric estimation of a state's likelihood of out of the fragile state category suggests that each year, the chances are less than 2% that a substantial impetus will begin. This implies that fragile states remain so an average of approximately 55
years. Chauvet and Collier identified factors which contribute to the emergence of a state from its fragile status: secondary education, population size, the gross income related to natural resources and technical assistance. A 1% increase in the number of those who have completed secondary education doubles the likelihood of the implementation of reforms, even if this condition has little impact on the progress of reform. In this way, the persistence of fragile status decreases from 55 to 37 years. Twenty-two countries in our sample are considered as fragile 11 and 45% of the states involved in internal armed conflict relapse into armed conflict within five years (ibid). In fragile states, the risk of civil war may be attributed to two major factors: the proportion of young men in the population and the weakness of growth (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2006 limiting the risks of war: at school, young men are busy and a long formal education increases their chances of employability. Thus, investment in education can reduce the risk of conflict, and our study corroborates previous results highlighting the importance of education in the peace process (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009 ). Education may therefore offer a way out of the "war trap" and, by extension, the poverty trap that some countries face. This positive framework is only sustainable if certain "returns on investment", such as the employability of youths, are obtained from success in formal schooling. Nevertheless, an increasing literature underlines the highly complex relationships between education and conflict. Bush and Saltarelli (2000) highlights how education has "two faces". In its positive face, as we have suggested, education can be a pathway to peace building. In the midst of a conflict, its maintenance is a means of socialisation and schools may provide an important mechanism for the protection of children against abuse (Smith and Vaux, 2003) . In its negative face, education might be a catalyst for war. Indeed, it can be used as a war weapon in promoting intolerance, in excluding certain groups to access to school or in exacerbating ethnic tensions. In some countries, the exaltation of nationalism in the history books may result in the rise of xenophobia and violence (UNESCO, 1998). Through social exclusion and indoctrination, schools can be a vehicle of violence (Novelli and Lopez Cardozo, 2008) as in Rwanda where the educational system established since colonial period has favored political, economic and social domination of Tutsis on Hutus. Lastly, the decentralisation policies, especially in education, could lead to effects counterproductive and deteriorate further a present fragile situation (Altinok, 2004) . Indeed, Châtaigner and Magro (2007) , show that civil wars in poorer countries since the end of the Cold War and the early 1990's are grew out of the weakening of states "privatized". With the 9/11 events, these fragile states have become a strategic issue for the international development agencies. Rebuild the rule of law and strengthen institutions have become a priority. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on what the term "fragile states" encompass or exclude. Those working within education aid have adopted the terminology "fragile states" but this concept remains ambiguous and appears to have come about to fill a conceptual gap in the aid literature (Bengtsson, 2011) . Fragile states, however, have one common characteristic: being or having been in conflict. But each situation is unique and the emergence of conflicts is a complex process in which education can be one of many causes inside a chicken or egg causality.
So, investment in education is necessary but, this is not a sufficient condition. On the one hand, education must be protected from political interference and clientelism (Weber, 2009 ).
On the other hand, educational development policies must be supported by a true and genuine political will, shared by all the stakeholders. If this is not the case, education may be viewed in its negative aspects, reinforcing the idea of the "education trap" as pointed out by Pritchett (2001).
Conclusion
This study discusses the negative impact of conflict on education. Our empirical analysis also indicates that social expenditures, especially expenditures in education, have a positive and very significant impact on the educational performance of our sample of countries. Military expenditures have the opposite effect. This trend indicates that when a country invests in the social sector, particularly in education, school enrollments increase significantly. This can also be interpreted as an indicator of government priorities. When a government gives priority to the social sector, it sends a signal to the population that lasting peace has returned, which in turn raises confidence in the civil peace needed to boost investment (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002) . Education can then play a part to reduce poverty.
Moreover, as suggested by Harber (2002) , education can be also a vehicle of peace in helping to promote democracy. Even if education systems cannot be the exclusive solution to the problem of democratisation, it can contribute to cultivate and develop the values and behaviors of a democratic political system. Our analysis shows that education can play a role in the development of political rights and civil liberties. In addition, the occurrence of civil conflicts in Africa is intimately related to government expenditure policy and, thus, the failure of a government to commit to a strong redistributive towards social domains such as education (Azam, 2001 ). As we have analyzed, in the midst of a conflict, education can be a part of the solution as well it can be also a driver of conflict (Smith, 2010) . In some countries, it is the school system itself that sows the seeds of war and conflict (Davies, 2005) . It is also generally accepted that periods of peace are more conducive to investments in the social sector. Studies show that pre-conflict periods are often marked by increased military expenditures, at the expense of education and / or health. These preliminary results are part of a larger work that attempts to highlight the impact of fragility on education. Our findings lead 22 us to raise certain questions for further study and analysis. Indeed, the primary school completion rate does not appear to be significantly affected by conflict, unlike the rate of children not attending school or that of secondary enrollment. According to our models, the intensity of the conflict does not appear to be a relevant factor in enrollment. These questions call for further, more in depth study to complete and complement this initial research. of those years; 40 times during the period of observation, the country experienced at least one conflict and four times, the country had to face two conflicts in the same year. Of the 60 observed periods, only Ethiopia experienced five conflicts in a single year. Only eight countries have not experienced conflict: Benin, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Sao-Tome-andPrincipe, Swaziland, Togo and Zambia.
